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Abstract
We analyze the impacts of bioenergy trade on greenhouse gas emissions using
a two-good, three-factor model. Bioenergy is an agricultural good used as
a substitute for fossil fuels in industry. Governments tax domestic pollution
without international coordination. We assume that northern countries have
higher labor productivity than southern ones and that agriculture is less
pollution intensive than industry (after taxation). We show that whereas
southern countries impose a lower tax rate than northern ones, they do not
necessary have a competitive advantage in industry, and that compared to
autarky, trade liberalization either increases or decreases worldwide emissions
depending on regional comparative advantages.
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1. Introduction
The potential of bioenergy in mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
from fossil fuels has recently stimulated both the scientiﬁc and the political
debate (von Lampe, 2006). Bioenergy is a relatively clean renewable alterna-
tive to fossil fuels but as an agricultural product (e.g. ethanol and biodiesel),
it competes for land and feedstock with food production.1 Moreover, al-
though its use does not emit additional GHG, its production does through
the use of fertilizers or chemicals and through the conversion of grasslands
and forested lands.2 Liberalizing trade of bioenergy could worsen this eﬀect
or allow industries to reduce GHG emissions by reducing fossil fuel use.
This paper examines the potential impacts of bioenergy trade, with a fo-
cus on the resulting worldwide GHG emissions. We determine the trade equi-
librium of a global economy with many countries belonging to two regions,
North and South, facing global pollution with no international coordination.
The two regions only diﬀer in their eﬀective labor endowment, Northern labor
being more productive. Each economy is composed of two sectors, agricul-
ture and industry, that emit GHG. The agricultural sector produces both a
ﬁnal good and an intermediate product, bioenergy. In this sector, pollution
arises as an increasing and convex function of land use. Pollution in the
other sector, industry, is proportional to the use of fossil fuels. We restrict
parameter values so that industry is the pollution intensive sector.
We have two major conclusions. First, we show that in equilibrium the
richer country, which imposes higher environmental taxes, may have a com-
parative advantage in the pollution intensive sector. This possibility arises
because of industrial producers' ability to substitute bioenergy for fossil fu-
els. The second result is that trade may increase or decrease the worldwide
level of GHG emissions. The direction of eﬀect depends on which country
has a comparative advantage in the dirty sector in trade. A key result is that
1For instance, to meet a 10 % share of biofuels in domestic transport fuel consumption,
the U.S., Canada and the E.U would need to use 30 %, 36 % and 72 % of their agricultural
lands respectively (von Lampe, 2006).
2Emissions from land conversion vary depending on the quality of land, on the history
of past land-uses and on the amount of carbon sequestrated in the soil and the biomass
(Schneider, 2007). A ﬁrst impact of land conversion is the release of carbon sequestrated
in the soil and the biomass (Searchinger et al., 2008; Fargione et al., 2008). A second
impact is the reduced sequestration capacity of agricultural land compared to grassland
and forest (Birdsey, 1992).
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the change in national emissions caused by trade is always greater in South
than in North. This result implies that if South has a comparative advan-
tage in industry, trade increases worldwide emissions, whereas if North has a
comparative advantage in industry, trade decreases worldwide emissions. We
ﬁnd that North is more likely to have a comparative advantage in industry
if bioenergy and fossil fuels are close substitute and if marginal emissions in
agriculture rise sharply with land use expansion.
Trade always increases emissions in one region and decreases emissions
in the other region. The eﬀect is more pronounced in South than in North,
which leads to our contrasting results on worldwide emissions. The reason is
as follows. Governments set their environmental regulations independently,
taking the other countries' emissions as given. Since North has more eﬀec-
tive units of labor, in equilibrium it has a higher income than South. Hence,
pollution taxes are always higher in North than in South in equilibrium. We
show that regional taxes (and wages) diﬀer in free trade, i.e. the Factor Price
Equalization theorem (FPE) does not hold due to the non-linearity of agri-
cultural emissions. As a result, if North exports industrial goods, industry
shifts to North where the cleaner technique leads to less aggregate pollution.
This eﬀect outweighs the increase in emissions coming from agricultural ex-
pansion in South. If, instead, South exports industrial goods, its emissions
rise and the global environment deteriorates.
Our set-up is close to Copeland & Taylor (1995), who ﬁnd that trade
increases worldwide emissions when South has a comparative advantage in
the dirty sector and when environmental taxes do not equalize across regions.
Our model, however, diﬀers from theirs in two respects. First, the nature of
pollution is diﬀerent across sectors: Whereas industrial emissions are propor-
tional to the use of fossil fuels, agricultural pollution is a convex function of
land use. Second, one sector produces both a ﬁnal good and an intermediate
good, as in Vanek (1963), that is used by industry to reduce pollution. These
diﬀerences also distinguish our set-up from Copeland & Taylor (1997, 2003),
who ﬁnd that trade impacts on worldwide pollution depend on the patterns
of trade. Whereas they consider speciﬁc factor models, our set-up can be
restated as a Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek trade model with labor and pollution
as inputs and with decreasing returns in agriculture.3 Chua (2003) shows
3Copeland & Taylor (1997) consider economies with two polluting sectors of diﬀerent
emissions intensities, but labor (capital) is used only by the less (most) pollution intensive
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that if there is an abatement sector, the region with the highest environmen-
tal tax may have a comparative advantage in the emission-intensive good.
An increase in the environmental tax increases the returns of the most in-
tensive factor in the abatement sector. The tax thus aﬀects diﬀerently the
production costs of the two ﬁnal-good sectors depending on their respective
factor intensities. Chua (2003) considers the impacts of exogenous tax rates
on autarky prices, whereas we allow tax rates to be endogenous and solve for
the free trade equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the
model and Section 3 examines the autarky equilibrium. Section 4 considers
the eﬀects of trade on the environment. The last section contains concluding
remarks.
2. The model
Consider a world economy with two regions (North and South), composed
of many countries : n in North and n∗ in South. In the rest of the paper,
we index by ′′∗′′ the variables corresponding to southern countries.4 All
countries within a region are identical. The population size of each country
is normalized to 1, but the labor force is more productive in North, leading
to a higher eﬀective labor in North than in South: L > L∗.
Each economy is composed of two sectors: agriculture (A) and industry
(M). Both sectors are responsible for GHG emissions, a pollutant leading
to global warming and aﬀecting the welfare of the world population. Indus-
try pollutes through the use of fossil fuels. Agriculture indirectly pollutes
through the use of land. The agricultural product can be used either as a ﬁ-
nal food product (F ) for consumers or as an intermediate product, bioenergy
(B), which enters the production process of industry, with A = F +B.
Industry M requires both labor (LM) and energy as inputs, the latter
being a mix of fossil energy (E) and bioenergy. Industrial emissions (ZM)
are proportional to the use of fossil fuels; carbon content is normalized to
1, so that ZM = E. Equivalently, we may consider that there are three in-
puts: labor, pollution and bioenergy. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production
sector. In Copeland & Taylor (2003), labor and capital are used by both sectors, but only
one pollutes.
4 Most of the computations are made for a northern country but are valid for a southern
one unless otherwise indicated.
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function in the industrial production, we get
M = L1−αM
[
E1−eBe
]α
= L1−αM Z
(1−e)α
M B
eα, (1)
where 0 < α < 1 indexes the share of energy uses and 0 < e < 1 the share of
bioenergy in the energy mix.5
The production of A units of agricultural goods is described by
A = KµAL
1−µ
A , (2)
where LA corresponds to labor and KA to land, and where 0 < µ < 1 is
the output elasticity of land. Land use KA generates ZA = ψ(KA) units
of GHG emissions with ψ′ > 0 and ψ′′ > 0. In the following, we assume
ψ(KA) = ζK
σ
A/σ, with ζ > 0 and σ > 1. The convexity of the agricultural
emission function reﬂects the fact that land conversion reduces the carbon
sequestration capacity of soil at an increasing rate, the equilibrium level of
carbon in cropland soils being lower than in pasture, which is itself lower
than in mature forests (Birdsey, 1992). While some of the carbon released
by soil conversion is captured back by the agricultural land in the long run,
there are nevertheless losses in the carbon sequestration capacity of soils that
correspond to net GHG emissions due to agricultural expansion.6
It is possible to restate the production process in agriculture as using
labor and GHG emissions according to the relation
A = (σ/ζ)µ/σZ
µ/σ
A L
1−µ
A . (3)
which will prove convenient when comparing agriculture with industry. How-
ever, (3) cannot be used interchangeably with (2) in solving the problem of
the agricultural producer. Indeed, as a function of labor and GHG emissions,
5We adopt a Cobb-Douglas production function for analytical convenience. The func-
tional form implicitly assumes that bioenergy is a necessary input for manufacturing.
Despite its lack of realism, it allows us to focus on the role of an intermediate product
that can be used for outsourcing pollution.
6We also assume that these losses are the same in southern and northern countries
whereas in fact they may be diﬀerent even for two countries in the same region. In
addition to analytical convenience, this symmetry allows us to illustrate our main point:
Even if North is richer and taxes more heavily GHG emissions than South, the competitive
advantage of each region depends on the substitutability between energies and on the non-
linearity of emissions in agriculture, not on heterogeneous damages.
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(3) exhibits decreasing returns to scale while (2), the relevant production
function which involves land and labor as inputs, exhibits constant returns
to scale. This diﬀerence is of course due to the convexity of the emission
function in agriculture.
We assume that GHG emissions harm only consumers. To reduce emis-
sions, governments adopt sectoral policies using sector-speciﬁc taxes on input
uses: fossil fuel tax τ for the industry and land tax τA for agriculture.
7 The
trade-oﬀ for industrial producers is between paying the environmental tax
and abating pollution, i.e. substituting bioenergy and labor for pollution.
To abstract from consideration of stock depletion, we assume that energy
and land are available in both regions without restriction. Therefore, the
fossil fuel price and the land price correspond to their respective tax: τ and
τA.
8 As emissions are proportional to the use of fossil fuels, the tax on fossil
fuels τ equals the carbon tax.
Denote by w the eﬀective labor wage and consider that the agricultural
good is the numeraire (i.e. pA = 1). Labor being perfectly mobile within
a country (but immobile across countries), the wage is identical across sec-
tors. Given that pA = 1, the unit-cost of the representative ﬁrm in industry
simpliﬁes to
cM(w, τ) = κM [w
1−ξτ ξ]1−eα, (4)
where κM ≡ α
−α(1 − α)α−1e−eα(1 − e)−(1−e)α is a constant, and where ξ ≡
(1− e)α/(1− eα) corresponds to the relativeoutput elasticity of fossil fuels
in the following sense. For a given level of biofuel use, consider the increase in
industrial production due to simultaneous equal marginal increases in labor
and fossil fuels: it is given by the sum of the output elasticities of fossil fuels
and labor, (1− e)α and 1−α respectively. The relative contribution of fossil
fuels in this increase is given by ξ (and 1− ξ = (1−α)/(1− eα) corresponds
to the contribution of labor). Observe that ξ also corresponds to the share
of the fossil fuel tax in the industrial cost net of biofuel expenditure, i.e.,
ξ = τZM/(τZM + wLM). Indeed, denoting by p the price of the industrial
good, the production cost divides among the inputs following Euler's rule,
7Considering taxes on the input uses of sectors exhibiting constant returns to scale
allows us to analyze bioenergy trade in a competitive trade framework.
8We assume that the government possesses all the information necessary to tax the
carbon content of fossil energy used in industry and the land used in agriculture without
cost.
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i.e.:
τZM = (1− e)αpM, (5)
wLM = (1− α)pM, (6)
B = eαpM. (7)
The total cost of producing A is AcA(w, τA), where
cA(w, τA) = κAw
1−µτµA (8)
and where κA ≡ µ
−µ(1− µ)µ−1, which leads to:
wLA = (1− µ)A (9)
τAKA = µA. (10)
The share of the environmental tax in the production cost corresponds to the
output elasticity of land, i.e., µ = τAKA/(τAKA+wLA). Using (3), the output
elasticity of GHG emissions in agriculture is given by µ/σ. Comparing ξ and
µ allows us to measure the sectoral wealth eﬀects due to GHG emissions while
the diﬀerence between ξ and µ/σ compares the relative productive eﬃciency
of GHG emissions in each sector.
As pollution is transboundary, consumers' utility is aﬀected by world
pollution Zw, the sum of the emissions of North and South : Zw = ZN +ZS.
Regional variables are indexed by superscripts N for North and S for South.
As countries are identical within a region, we have ZN = nZ with Z =
ZM + ZA for North. The utility of the representative consumer is given by:
U = bA lnDA + bM lnDM − β(Z
w)γ/γ, (11)
where DA and DM are the quantities of goods consumed, with bA + bM = 1.
We assume that β > 0 and γ ≥ 1 to ensure that the marginal willingness
to pay for abating pollution is a nondecreasing function of world pollution.
The corresponding expenditure function is:
E(u¯, Zw) ≡ min
DA,DM
{DA + pDM : U ≥ u¯} = E0 exp(u¯+ β(Z
w)γ/γ),
where E0 = exp {bA ln bA + bM ln bM − bM ln p}. Demands satisfy pDM =
bME(u¯, Z
w), and DA = bAE(u¯, Z
w), hence bA and bM correspond to the
budget shares of food and industrial goods respectively. The balanced bud-
get constraint implies that national expenses E(u¯, Zw) should not exceed
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national revenue I. Assuming the proceeds of the environmental taxes are
redistributed to consumers through a lump-sum transfer, we have
I ≡ wL+ τZM + τAKA, (12)
using L = LA + LM . Due to the transborder nature of the externality,
optimality is not achieved without international coordination. A Nash equi-
librium results from the absence of negotiation, each government deﬁning
ZM and ZA for its country while considering the emissions from all other
countries as exogenous. It imposes taxes on fossil fuels and on land so that
the utility of the representative consumer is maximized. Diﬀerentiating the
balanced budget constraint E(u¯, Zw) = I allows us to determine the eﬀects
of small emission variations dZM and dKA around their optimal levels. We
have, neglecting price eﬀects9
E(u¯, Zw)[du¯+ β(Zw)γ−1(dZM + ψ
′(KA)dKA)] = τdZM + τAdKA.
At the optimum, du¯ = 0, which leads to the conditions
τ = βI (Zw)γ−1 (13)
τA = ψ
′(KA)τ. (14)
Environmental taxes increase with national income and worldwide emissions.
The environment is thus a normal good. The land tax also increases with the
amount of land used and is equivalent to a (Pigouvian) tax on agricultural
emissions: we have τdZA = τψ
′(KA)dKA = τAdKA. Farmers, however, have
to pay a tax proportional to the marginal emission level ψ′(KA) = ζK
σ−1
A ,
which increases with KA since σ > 1.
By implementing τ and τA the government implicitly deﬁnes the emissions
supply of the country: using (12) and ψ′(KA)KA = σZA, we get
τ
w
=
βL (Zw)γ−1
1− β[ZM + σZA] (Zw)
γ−1 . (15)
9Price eﬀects cancel out through market equilibrium conditions in autarky. When
considering trade, the same equations hold as long as the government policy has no impact
on international prices, i.e. the number of countries is large. We thus abstract from the
use of environmental policies as commercial levies.
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which depends on the eﬀective labor endowment. Pollution demands are
derived from (5)-(10) and (14). We obtain
ZA/LA = (w/τ)µ/[σ(1− µ)] (16)
ZM/LM = (w/τ)ξ/(1− ξ) (17)
for agriculture and industry respectively. Observe that the pollution intensity
in agriculture is smaller the higher the elasticity of land use emission σ.
This is the result of the optimal land tax which, given (14), is such that
τAKA = στZA. Although the marginal taxes on emissions are the same (as
noted above), the total tax on land use is higher than its equivalent in terms
of carbon emissions because σ > 1. Comparing (16) and (17), the industry
is relatively pollution intensive and agriculture labor intensive if
µ/(1− µ) < σξ/(1− ξ) H1
which is assumed in the rest of the paper. For e = 0 (no substitution between
fossil energy and bioenergy), ξ = α and H1 is satisﬁed if µ < α. Hence, when
it is impossible to substitute bioenergy for fossil fuels, agriculture is cleaner
than industry if the output elasticity of land in agriculture is lower than
the output elasticity of energy in industry. However, when e is large, close
to 1, i.e. for an industry highly intensive in bioenergy, ξ is very close to 0
and µ must be very low and σ very large for agriculture to be cleaner than
industry. Empirical evidence supports the assumption that agriculture is
less pollution intensive than industry, although it is not pollution-free.10 It
is easily obtained that H1 implies ξ > µ/σ, i.e. that the (relative) output
elasticity of GHG emissions is larger in industry than in agriculture.
At equilibrium, demand and supply are equal. Pollution demand is re-
lated to the consumers' consumption of goods which depends on the openness
10Schipper et al. (2001) show that agriculture is less carbon intensive than the manufac-
turing industries in several developed countries. Carbon intensities are measured by the
amount of carbon per value added in each sector in 1994. Estimates in the manufacturing
sector are 210 gC/USD in Denmark, 127 gC/USD in France, and 267 gC/USD in the
U.S., whereas in agriculture they are 110, 37 and 50 respectively. Since the estimates are
based on energy consumption, they omit emissions from land use changes and deforesta-
tion, in particular the carbon debt that represents approximately 17 to 123 times more
carbon emissions than the annual savings of fossil fuel replacement from biofuel (Fargione
et al., 2008). Schneider & Smith (2009) also show that emissions intensities vary with
agricultural practices and land management changes.
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to trade of the countries. As a benchmark, we ﬁrst investigate the case of
autarky. We then detail the eﬀects of trade.
3. Autarky and comparative advantages
Under autarky, both regions consume only locally produced goods. Mar-
ket equilibria give pM = pDM = bMI and A = DA + B = [bA + eαbM ]I.
Using τZM = (1 − e)αbMI, τAKA = µ(eαbM + bA)I, (13) and (14), lead to
the pollution demand from each sector:
ZM = (1− e)αbM/[β(Z
w)γ−1] (18)
ZA = µ(eαbM + bA)/[σβ(Z
w)γ−1]. (19)
Consequently, the national demand of pollution is given by
Z = ZM + ZA = θ/[β(Z
w)γ−1] (20)
where θ ≡ (1− e)αbM + µ(eαbM + bA)/σ. Pollution demands depend on the
world pollution level and on parameters that are the same in both regions.
Hence, despite their diﬀerence in income, northern and southern emission
levels are the same under autarky: Z = Z∗ = Za. This result is due to the
combination of ﬁxed shares of income spent in ﬁnal good consumption and of
ﬁxed shares of production cost spent in environmental taxes (Cobb-Douglas
functional forms).11 Expressions (18), (19) and (20) show that the GHG
emissions of a country decrease with the worldwide emissions level Zw.12
The resulting world level of GHG emissions under autarky is given by
Zwa = (n+ n∗)Za = [(n+ n∗)θ/β]1/γ . (21)
Consequently, we have the following result:
11Because North is richer, its economies have a larger scale than in South, which tends
to increase emissions (scale eﬀect). North, however, is also more prone to tax pollution,
which makes its production cleaner (technical eﬀect). These two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each
other in the case of the Cobb-Douglas utility function. This functional form also implies
constant shares of expenses in the ﬁnal goods, thus there is no composition eﬀect at work
in autarky (see Copeland and Taylor 2003 for a more detailed presentation of these eﬀects).
12As Zw is the sum of emissions of all countries, the levels given by (18), (19) and (20)
are deﬁned only implicitly: these equations do not correspond to best reply functions" of
a particular country to the GHG emissions strategy of the other countries.
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Proposition 1. Under autarky, northern and southern countries use the
same amount of land and emit the same level of pollution.
Under autarky, pollution is not a distinctive pattern for North and South:
sector emissions of GHG are identical from one country to another. Of course,
as eﬀective labor endowments in South are lower than in North, emission
intensities are larger in South than in North. Using (8), (13), (14) and (15),
we obtain that
Proposition 2. Under autarky, relative factor prices are higher in North:
(τ/w)/(τ ∗/w∗) = L/L∗ > 1, and the environmental taxes and the national
income are higher in North: τA/τ
∗
A = τ/τ
∗ = I/I∗ = (L/L∗)1−µ > 1, whereas
the eﬀective labor wage is lower in North: w/w∗ = (L∗/L)µ < 1.
Because of a larger eﬀective labor endowment, income and environmental
taxes (wages) are larger (lower) in North than in South in autarky. These
discrepancies depend on the relative labor endowment and on µ. The higher
the output elasticity of land, the lower the wages and the taxes in North
compared to South, but these eﬀects cancel out when considering the ratio
of factor prices.
Gains from trade depend on each region's comparative advantage. Since
North has a larger labor endowment while pollution levels are the same,
relative factor abundance theory predicts that in trade, North specializes in
labor-intensive agriculture whereas South specializes in pollution-intensive
industry under H1. However, using (4) we obtain
cM(w, τ)/cM(w
∗, τ ∗) = (L∗/L)(µ−ξ)(1−eα).
As a consequence, North has a comparative advantage in industry iﬀ µ > ξ.13
This condition is compatible with H1 if σ > 1. More precisely,
Lemma 1. Southern countries have a comparative advantage in the labor
intensive agriculture and northern countries in the GHG intensive industry
if µ, ξ and σ satisfy
σξ/[1 + (σ − 1)ξ] > µ > ξ.
If ξ > µ, southern countries have a comparative advantage in the GHG
intensive industry and northern countries in agriculture.
13Only industrial costs diﬀer across regions since the agricultural good is the numeraire.
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Since ξ is decreasing in e, the more substitutable fossil fuels and bioenergy
are, the more likely North has a comparative advantage in industry. Industry,
however, must remain the most pollution intensive sector after substituting
bioenergy for pollution. A higher GHG emissions rate in agriculture σ makes
it easier for this condition to hold since the environmental tax is more strin-
gent in agriculture.
Figure 1 illustrates the two possible cases.14 µ > ξ leads to a steeper
industrial iso-cost curve relative to the agricultural curve and corresponds
to intensities satisfying σZA/LA > ZM/LM > ZA/LA. On the opposite,
µ < ξ leads to a steeper iso-cost curve in agriculture than in industry, and
we have ZM/LM > σZA/LA under H1. As σ > 1, industry is more pollution
intensive than agriculture in any case. Since land use is the same in both
regions, agricultural iso-cost curves are identical. However, the industrial iso-
cost curve of the region with a comparative advantage in industry is located
below the other. In both situations, the factor price ratio (τ/w) is larger in
North than in South.
This ambiguity in the patterns of trade has not received much attention,
except in Copeland & Taylor (1997, 2003) and Chua (2003). Usually, trade
liberalization will see South having a comparative advantage in the emission
intensive good and North in the cleaner good. But the non-linearity of the
emission due to land conversion implies that agriculture could have a ﬂatter
iso-cost curve than in industry.
A higher environmental tax impacts both sectors through the input prices
τ and τA, but the resulting eﬀect on the output relative price is intricate.
In industry, the rise in the energy prices implies that it is more costly to
produce industrial goods even if it is possible to substitute bioenergy for
fossil fuels. In agriculture, since τA = τψ
′(KA), the land price is aﬀected
directly through the change in τ but also through the change in the demand
for bioenergy which may result in a higher demand for land. When σ is large,
the impact on the agricultural price of a higher tax exceeds the impact on
the industrial price. Consequently, a tighter environmental policy induces a
14Using (4), (8) and (14), the slopes of the iso-cost curves are given by (dτ/dw)|cM=p =
−(τ/w)(1 − ξ)/ξ = −LM/ZM for industry and by (dτ/dw)|cA=1 = −(τ/w)(1 − µ)/µ =
−LA/(σZA) for agriculture. The latter does not correspond to the inverse of the
pollution intensity in this sector since the Shepard lemma does only apply to inputs
chosen by the farmer: LA and KA = ψ
−1(ZA). We thus have −(dτ/dw)|cA=1 =
(∂cA/∂w)/(∂cA/∂τ)/ψ
′(KA) = σ
−1LA/ZA.
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decrease (a rise) in the relative price p when σ is large (small), which explains
the potential for reversing comparative advantages.
4. Trade impacts on the environment
A ﬁrst appraisal of trade impacts on the environment is deduced from
the sectorial emission demands (16) and (17) and the government pollution
supply (15). Indeed, using the labor market equilibrium we get
ZAσ/µ+ ZM/ξ = (Z
w)1−γ/β. (22)
which holds regardless of the country's openness to trade and whatever Zw.
Indicating with superscript t trade equilibrium values, we thus have ZtM −
Z∗tM = (Z
∗t
A − Z
t
A)ξσ/µ. Hence, if Z
t
M > Z
∗t
M we also have Z
∗t
A > Z
t
A: if
industrial emissions are larger in North than in South (as we may expect if
µ > ξ), agricultural emissions will be larger in South than in North, and
reciprocally if comparative advantages are the opposite. Moreover, as ξ >
µ/σ under H1, we have ||ZtM − Z
∗t
M || ≥ ||Z
∗t
A − Z
t
A||, and the inequality is
strict if trade induces a discrepancy of sector emissions between countries.
Hence, if ZtM > Z
∗t
M , we have Z
t = ZtM + Z
t
A > Z
∗t
M+ Z
∗t
A = Z
∗t, whereas if
Z∗tM > Z
t
M , we have Z
∗t > Zt. Consequently, under H1,
Lemma 2. Trade liberalization induces a higher GHG emissions level in
countries that have a comparative advantage in industry.
The eﬀects of trade on the emission patterns are derived using the iceberg
cost approach (Samuelson, 1954) of trade frictions which take the form of a
shrinkage of the industrial goods in transit so that only a fraction of the
items shipped abroad actually arrives.15 The presence of iceberg costs implies
that industrial good prices diﬀer when all countries are open to trade: we
have p∗M = ωpM , where ω is the trade coeﬃcient. Considering the case
of a diversiﬁed equilibrium (which supposes that labor endowments are not
too diﬀerent), trade implies that cM(w
∗, τ ∗) = ωcM(w, τ) and cA(w
∗, τ ∗A) =
15To simplify computations, we assume that there is no friction in the transport of
agricultural goods which also allows us to have the same numeraire in every countries.
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cA(w, τA).
16 Consequently, using (14), we obtain the relative factor prices
τ/τ ∗ = (KA/K
∗
A)
−ν(1−ξ) ϑ1−µ (23)
w/w∗ = (KA/K
∗
A)
νξ ϑ−µ, (24)
where ν ≡ µ(σ − 1)/(µ− ξ) and ϑ ≡ ωξ/[α(1−e)(µ−ξ)]. Free trade corresponds
to ϑ = 1 while there is no trade if ϑ ≥ ϑ¯ ≡ L/L∗. Hence, relevant values for
ϑ belong to [1, ϑ¯], and raising ϑ increases trade frictions.
From (5) and (10), we obtain that at the trade equilibrium
τZNM + τAK
N
A + τ
∗ZSM + τ
∗
AK
S
A = φ(I
N + IS),
where φ ≡ (1 − e)αbM + µ(eαbM + bA) is the share of environmental taxes
in global income. Using (12), North's relative shares in global income,
wages and tax revenues of each region, denoted by δI ≡ I
N/(IN + IS),
δL = wL
N/[(1−φ)(IN + IS)], and δZ = (τZ
N
M + τAK
N
A )/[φ(I
N + IS)] respec-
tively, satisfy
δI = (1− φ)δL + φδZ . (25)
Hence, the northern share of global income is a weighted sum of the northern
shares of revenues from labor wages and from environmental taxes. Use of
(14) and (25) gives the inverse pollution demand in trade:
τ
w
=
φ
1− φ
δZ
δL
L
ZM + σZA
. (26)
Equalizing supply (15) and demand (26) of pollution, and using (22), gives
ZtM =
ξ(µ− φδZ/δI)
(µ− ξ)β(Zw)γ−1
(27)
ZtA =
µ(φδZ/δI − ξ)
σ(µ− ξ)β(Zw)γ−1
, (28)
which, given (25) and θ = (µ − ξσ)φ + ξµ(σ − 1)/[σ(µ − ξ)], amount to a
domestic pollution level satisfying
Zt =
θ
β(Zw)γ−1
[
1 +
φ(1− φ)
θ
ξ − µ/σ
µ− ξ
δL − δZ
δI
]
. (29)
16As ψ′(0) = 0, the land price is negligible when only low levels of land are involved and
thus both regions produce the agricultural good. However, it may be the case that some
countries specialize in agriculture.
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Expressions similar to (27) and (28) are obtained for a southern country by
replacing δi by 1− δi, with i = Z, I, L, and we have
Z∗t =
θ
β(Zw)γ−1
[
1−
φ(1− φ)
θ
ξ − µ/σ
µ− ξ
δL − δZ
1− δI
]
. (30)
Finally, adding (29) and (30) and rearranging terms gives
Zwt = Zwa
[
1 +
φ(1− φ)
θ
ξ − µ/σ
µ− ξ
δL − δZ
δI(1− δI)
(
n
n+ n∗
− δI
)]1/γ
. (31)
Comparing (20) with (29) and (30) suggests that the emissions of a north-
ern and a southern country are also decreasing with worldwide emission level
Zw in trade. Inspection of (29), (30) and (31) reveals that the trade eﬀects
depend both on the discrepancies between µ and ξ and between δZ and δL.
It is easily deduced from proposition 2 that δZ = δI = δL under autarky,
and thus that (20) is a particular case of both expressions (29) and (30). If
trade induces a discrepancy between δZ and δL (which is the case, as shown
below), emissions of northern and southern countries are aﬀected in opposite
directions.
Under free trade, i.e. when ϑ = 1, we obtain the following results17
Proposition 3. Under diversiﬁed free trade,
i/ the use of land is diﬀerent depending on the region: K∗tA > K
t
A iﬀ µ > ξ.
ii/ whatever the comparative advantage of each region, we have I > I∗,
τ > τ ∗ and w < w∗.
Proof: see the appendix.
Factor prices diﬀer across regions under free trade, hence the FPE theo-
rem does not hold in our context. Moreover, since North is richer than South
in free trade, it has a greater carbon tax than South: τ > τ ∗, whatever the
comparative advantage of each region.
Figure 2 illustrates the free trade equilibrium, panel 2a corresponding to
µ > ξ and panel 2b to ξ > µ. The industrial iso-cost curves are identical
17The eﬀects of trade liberalization, i.e. a decrease in ϑ from ϑ¯ are detailed in Bourgeon
& Ollivier (2011)
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across regions whereas the agricultural iso-cost curves diﬀer due to the dif-
ference in land use. When µ > ξ, South exploits its comparative advantage
in agriculture, its iso-cost curve is thus lower than the northern one since
the amount of productive land is higher in South. The situation is reversed
when µ < ξ. As in ﬁgure 1, the factor price ratio is larger in North than in
South in both cases.
Denoting by za(Zw), zt(Zw) and z∗t(Zw) the LHS of (20), (29), (30) re-
spectively, it is easily obtained that
n||zt(Zw)− za(Zw)|| = n∗||z∗t(Zw)− z∗a(Zw)||(I∗/I). (32)
From proposition 3 and using (32), we can infer that trade impacts on
the environment depend on the comparative advantage of each region:
Proposition 4. Under diversiﬁed free trade,
i/ if North (South) has a comparative advantage in industry (agricul-
ture), northern emissions increase, southern emissions decrease, and
the worldwide emission level decreases.
ii/ If North (South) has a comparative advantage in agriculture (indus-
try), northern emissions decrease, southern emissions increase, and
the worldwide emission level increases.
Proof: see the appendix.
Given I > I∗ and (32), trade has a larger eﬀect on southern emissions
than on northern ones: compared to autarky, the variation of the GHG
emissions in South more than compensate the change in North. If trade
increases emissions in North, it also reduces more importantly emissions in
South, leading to a decrease of worldwide emissions. Reciprocally, if trade
reduces emissions in North, the large increase in emissions in South results in
a larger level of GHG emissions worldwide. Figure 3 illustrates the case when
northern emissions rise in trade (assuming n = n∗ in this ﬁgure): we have
zt(Zw) > za(Zw) > z∗t(Zw). At level Zwa, we have nzt(Zwa) + n∗z∗t(Zwa) <
(n + n∗)za(Zwa) = Zwa, implying that trade reduces worldwide emissions
(hence a resulting level Zwt < Zwa).
If North has a comparative advantage in industry, its total level of emis-
sions is larger in trade than in autarky. Even though northern industries
16
use more bioenergy than southern ones, the positive trade impact on the
global environment owes more to the relocation of southern industries than
to northern eﬀorts in using more bioenergy. By contrast, when South has
a comparative advantage in industry, trade deteriorates the global environ-
ment. Facing a lower environmental tax, southern industries use less bioen-
ergy per unit of industrial good than northern ones. As a consequence, the
demand for bioenergy inputs and the international market for bioenergy are
likely to be small.
5. Conclusion
Trade of commodities and bioenergy has an impact on the environment
which can be beneﬁcial if North has a comparative advantage in industry.
In that case, the level of global GHG emissions is reduced compared to au-
tarky, while it is increased if South is the most industrial region. These
opposite impacts rest on diﬀerences in environmental taxes, since the tax is
higher in North than in South at equilibrium whatever the comparative ad-
vantage. When North is the industrial region, because of its more stringent
environmental regulation, the reallocation of pollution-intensive industries in
the northern countries result in an improved worldwide environmental situ-
ation. Hence, considering the quality of the environment in terms of GHG
emission levels alone allows us to conclude on the positive impact of trade if
North is the industrial region. This view, however, excludes other aspects of
land use changes which are not accounted for in the GHG emissions, such as
biodiversity loss, soil erosion and ecosystem disturbances.
We also assume that no country has the capability to inﬂuence the terms
of trade whereas a few countries dominate the bioenergy market currently.18
A major exporter of bioenergy could beneﬁt from an increase in the relative
price of these goods (Rauscher, 1994; Copeland & Taylor, 1995) and thus
would have an incentive to increase its land tax while decreasing its carbon
tax. As a result, the impacts of trade on the world pollution level would
diminish when terms-of-trade eﬀects are taken into account.
18For example, of the 2.8 billion liters of ethanol exports globally in 2008, Brazil exported
97 percent, primarily to Europe, Japan, India, and the U.S. (Source: 'World Biofuel Mar-
itime Shipping Study', by IEA Bioenergy Task 40, April 2009. www.bioenergytrade.com).
17
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Appendix
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 3
We ﬁrst determine the relative shares of income δZ , δL and δI using (13),
(23),(24) and (25). We get δI = [1 + (n
∗/n) [KA/K
∗
A]
ν(1−ξ) ϑ−(1−µ)]−1, δZ =
[δI − (1− φ)δL]/φ and δL = [1 + (L
S/LN) [KA/K
∗
A]
−νξ ϑµ]−1. We also have
δL
δI
=
1 + (n∗/n)(τ ∗/τ)
1 + (LS/LN)(w∗/w)
=
1 + (n∗/n) [KA/K
∗
A]
ν(1−ξ) ϑ−(1−µ)
1 + (LS/LN) [KA/K∗A]
−νξ ϑµ
, (A.1)
and symmetrically, φ(1− δZ)/(1− δI) = 1− (1− φ)(1− δL)/(1− δI) where
1− δL
1− δI
=
(LS/LN) [KA/K
∗
A]
−νξ
(n∗/n) [KA/K∗A]
ν(1−ξ)
ϑ
δL
δI
. (A.2)
These two equations and (28) for North and South lead to a ratio of land
use KA/K
∗
A thats solves at equilibrium:[
KA
K∗A
]σ
=
1− ξ − (1− φ)∆(KA/K
∗
A)
1− ξ − (1− φ)∆(KA/K∗A)[KA/K
∗
A]
−ν (L∗/L)ϑ
(A.3)
where
∆(k) =
1 + (n∗/n)kν(1−ξ)ϑ−(1−µ)
1 + (LS/LN)k−νξϑµ
.
Without trade frictions, ϑ = 1 and (A.3) can be expressed as Ω(KA/K
∗
A, L
∗/L) =
0 where
Ω(k, ℓ) ≡ kσ − gˆ(k, ℓ)
with
gˆ(k, ℓ) =
1/ξ − 1− fˆ(k, ℓ)
1/ξ − 1− fˆ(k, ℓ)k−νℓ
and
fˆ(k, ℓ) = (1− φ)
1 + (n∗/n)kν(1−ξ)
ξ[1 + (n∗/n)ℓ/kνξ]
.
As ν = µ(σ − 1)/(µ − ξ), factor prices equalize only if KA = K
∗
A. As
Ω(1, 1) = 0, this is the case for L = L∗. We ﬁrst show that this is the only
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case, i.e. Ω(1, ℓ) 6= 0 for all ℓ ∈ (0, 1). The condition Ω(1, ℓ) = 0 can be
written gˆ(1, ℓ) = 1. As
∂gˆ(k, ℓ)
∂ℓ
= −
∂fˆ(k, ℓ)
∂ℓ
(1/ξ − 1)(1− k
−ν
ℓ)
[1/ξ − 1− fˆ(k, ℓ)k−νℓ]2
+
fˆ(k, ℓ)k
−ν
[1/ξ − 1− fˆ(k, ℓ)]
[1/ξ − 1− fˆ(k, ℓ)k−νℓ]2
where
∂fˆ(k, ℓ)
∂ℓ
= −fˆ(k, ℓ)
(n∗/n)k−νξ
1 + (n∗/n)ℓ/kνξ
,
we have
∂gˆ(1, ℓ)
∂ℓ
=
fˆ(1, ℓ)
[1/ξ − 1− fˆ(1, ℓ)ℓ]2
{
(1/ξ − 1)(1− ℓ)
(n∗/n)
1 + (n∗/n)ℓ
+ 1/ξ − 1− fˆ(1, ℓ)
}
where the bracketed term is positive if
fˆ(1, ℓ) < (1/ξ − 1)
{
(1− ℓ)(n∗/n)
1 + (n∗/n)ℓ
+ 1
}
= (1/ξ − 1)
1 + (n∗/n)
1 + (n∗/n)ℓ
which leads to the condition 0 > ξ − φ = (ξ − µ)[1− (1− eα)bM ]. Hence, if
µ < ξ (µ > ξ), gˆ(1, ℓ) is decreasing (increasing) in ℓ. In either case, gˆ(1, ℓ)
is monotonic in ℓ, implying that KA = K
∗
A only for L = L
∗. We now
characterize KA/K
∗
A when L
∗/L is close to 1. Using the implicit function
theorem, we have KA/K
∗
A = kˆ(L
∗/L) where kˆ(ℓ) is a function satisfying
kˆ(1) = 1 and
kˆ′(ℓ) =
∂gˆ(kˆ(ℓ), ℓ)/∂ℓ
σkˆ(ℓ)σ−1 − ∂gˆ(kˆ(ℓ), ℓ)/∂k
.
We have
∂gˆ(k, ℓ)
∂k
= −
∂fˆ(k, ℓ)
∂k
(1/ξ − 1)(1− k
−ν
ℓ)
[1/ξ − 1− fˆ(k, ℓ)k−νℓ]2
−
νξfˆ(k, ℓ)k−(ν+1)ℓgˆ(k, ℓ)
1− ξ − ξfˆ(k, ℓ)k−νℓ
,
hence
∂gˆ(1, 1)
∂k
=
−νfˆ(1, 1)
1/ξ − 1− fˆ(1, 1)
=
ν(1− φ)
ξ − φ
=
−µ(1− φ)(σ − 1)
(µ− ξ)2[1− (1− eα)bM ]
< 0.
We thus have kˆ′(1) > 0 (implying KA < K
∗
A) when ∂gˆ(1, 1)/∂ℓ > 0, i.e.
when µ > ξ, and the opposite when µ < ξ. As K∗A > KA and ν > 0 when
µ > ξ and K∗A < KA and ν < 0 when µ < ξ, we deduce from (23) and (24)
that we always have τ > τ ∗ and w < w∗. From (13), it comes I > I∗.
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Figure 1: Factor prices under autarky.
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Figure 2: Factor prices under free trade.
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Figure 3: Eﬀects of trade on emissions compared to autarky.
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